Credit risk in US banking, the spxtivdfreg way
Nagoya University (GSID)
June 11, 2026
Act I
When the 2007–2009 crisis struck, non-performing loans surged across the whole US banking system at once.
Two channels did it: spatial spillovers between banks, and common factors — macro shocks that hit every bank at once.
Stata’s xsmle and spxtregress model only the first.
\[NPL_{it} = \psi \sum_{j=1}^{N} w_{ij}\, NPL_{jt} + \rho\, NPL_{i,t-1} + x_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \lambda_i' f_t + \varepsilon_{it}\]
Spatial lag \(\psi W\,NPL\), temporal lag \(\rho\,NPL_{i,t-1}\), endogenous covariates \(x_{it}\beta\), bank effect \(\alpha_i\), and the latent factors \(\lambda_i' f_t\) — every term but \(\alpha_i\) is a source of endogeneity.
Act II
NPL, non-performing loans over total loans (%)Strongly balanced: every bank in every quarter. The matrix is row-standardized with about 18 neighbours per bank, so the spatial lag is a weighted average of interconnected banks.
Removing the factors first kills the cross-sectional dependence — no incidental-parameters bias, no Lee–Yu correction.
splag adds the spatial lag, tlags(1) the temporal lag, iv(...) instruments INEFF with INTEREST and lags, std standardizes before extracting factors.
Heterogeneous loadings \(\lambda_i\) let each bank react to the same aggregate shock with its own intensity — something two-way fixed effects cannot do.
0.394
\(\psi\), spatial autoregressive parameter (z = 4.65, p < 0.001) — neighbours’ NPL up 1 pp raises this bank’s NPL by 0.39 pp
| Term | Coef. | z | Sig.? |
|---|---|---|---|
| \(\psi\) (W·NPL) | 0.394 | 4.65 | yes |
| \(\rho\) (L1.NPL) | 0.290 | 5.33 | yes |
| LIQUIDITY | 2.452 | 9.09 | yes |
| INEFF | 0.447 | 4.28 | yes |
| BUFFER | −0.055 | −4.59 | yes |
Hansen J: \(\chi^2(19) = 18.83\), \(p = 0.468\) — fails to reject, so the instruments survive overidentification.
33.5%
\(\rho_{factor} = \sigma_f^2 / (\sigma_f^2 + \sigma_e^2)\) with \(\sigma_f = 0.642\), \(\sigma_e = 0.904\) — the share a no-factor model would bake into biased coefficients
Act III
| Term | With factors | Without factors |
|---|---|---|
| \(\psi\) (spatial) | 0.394*** | 0.288*** |
| \(\rho\) (temporal) | 0.290*** | 0.594*** |
| LIQUIDITY | 2.452*** | 0.843*** |
| Factors \((r_x, r_u)\) | 2, 1 | 0, 0 |
| J-test \(p\) | 0.468 | 0.000 |
Excluded factors are serially correlated, so \(\rho\) swells to absorb them — and the instruments are no longer valid.
Omitting factors can hide a genuine relationship, not just inflate spurious ones.
| Term | Full model | Without spatial lag |
|---|---|---|
| \(\psi\) (W·NPL) | 0.394*** | — |
| \(\rho\) (L1.NPL) | 0.290*** | 0.323*** |
| INEFF | 0.447*** | 0.638*** |
| SIZE | 0.223** | 0.346*** |
| J-test \(p\) | 0.468 | 0.226 |
Both pass the J-test — the choice is economic, and theory says banks are interconnected.
7.765
Long-run total effect of LIQUIDITY vs a short-run coefficient of 2.452 — amplified over time and across the network
\[\text{Total LR effect} = \frac{\beta}{(1-\rho)(1-\psi)} = \frac{2.452}{(1-0.290)(1-0.394)} \approx 7.77\]
The temporal multiplier \(1/(1-\rho) = 1.41\) compounds the shock over time; the spatial multiplier \(1/(1-\psi) = 1.65\) spreads it across the network.
Objection. The mean-group estimator drives the spatial lag to insignificance (\(\psi = 0.032\), \(p = 0.536\)). So maybe the spillovers were never real.
Response. Imposing homogeneous slopes on heterogeneous banks can manufacture spurious spatial dependence — but MG is only \(\sqrt{N}\)-consistent with just 35 periods, so a few outlier banks can swamp the average. Read it as a caution, not a refutation: \(\rho\) stays stable at 0.301, and theory still predicts interconnection.
| Full | No factors | No spatial | MG | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| \(\psi\) | 0.394*** | 0.288*** | — | 0.032 |
| \(\rho\) | 0.290*** | 0.594*** | 0.323*** | 0.301*** |
| LIQUIDITY | 2.452*** | 0.843*** | 2.534*** | 6.330*** |
| J-test \(p\) | 0.468 | 0.000 | 0.226 | — |
The J-test decides factors; theory and significance decide the spatial lag; MG is a robustness check, read with care.